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Abstract 
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B.A., University of North Carolina at Charlotte 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
Chairperson: Dr. Cary Fraser 
 
Chinese national identity can be understood in three periods: socialist China (1949-1975), 
post socialist China (1975-2010), and China post-Deng (2010-2019). Policies towards 
Uighurs in the Xinjiang region can be compared over these three periods, demonstrating the 
continuities and discontinuities in Chinese national identity over time. These periods frame 
the response of the Uighurs to Chinese policy. Mao, Zedong Deng Xiaoping, and Xi Jinping 
are key elite figures in shaping Chinese national identity. The various Constitutions of China 
and white papers are used to understand how the elite in China view Chinese national 
identity. Chinese policies towards Uighurs have shifted in accordance to Chinese national 
identity and Chinese national identity has changed since 1949 to the present. 
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This project focuses on understanding the development of Chinese national identity 
since the PRC takeover in 1949 to the present. The case of the Uighurs in Xinjiang is used to 
understand the continuities and discontinuities in Chinese policies and elite viewpoints. 
Furthermore, this project separates Chinese state’s development into three periods. Chapter 
two, focuses on the socialist period of China (1949-1975); chapter three, the post-socialist 
period (1975-2010); and chapter four, focuses on China post-Deng (2010-2019).1 Chapter 
five focuses on unifying the previous three chapters to better demonstrate how Chinese 
national identity impacts Chinese policy towards Uighurs and implications this has for how 
China legitimizes its rule and how China understands itself. The remainder of this chapter 
will focus on the importance of Chinese national identity to the Xinjiang region and ethnic 
minorities in China. Likewise, this chapter will define Chinese national identity and the 
considerations therein. The fall of the nationalist party and the 1919 May fourth movement 
left China open to three major revolutions that can be traced along with the rise of the PRC in 
                                                 
1 See among others, John, Fitzgerald “The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese 
Nationalism.” In Chinese Nationalism, 56-85. New York: Armonk, 1996. Daniel F, Vukovich. China and 
Orientalism: Western Knowledge Production and the P.R.C. London: Taylor and Francis, 2013. Lucian W, Pye. 
“How China's Nationalism Was Shanghaied.” In Chinese Nationalism, 86-112. New York: Armonk, 1996. 
Andre Gunder, Frank. “The World Economic System in Asia before European Hegemony.” The Historian 56, 
no. 2 (1994): 259-76. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6563. 1994.tb01307. x. Mayfair, Yang Mei-hui. Gifts, Favors, and 
Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China. Cornell University Press, 1994. Cary, Fraser. “An 
American Dilemma Race and Realpolitik in the American Response to the Bandung Conference, 1955.” Ebsco 
Publishing Appalachian, 2016. R. Baogang, He. and Mark E. Warren. “Authoritarian Deliberation: The 
Deliberative Turn in Chinese Political Development.” In Essential readings in comparative politics. 
Perspectives on Politics 9, no. 02 (2011): 269-89. doi:10.1017/s1537592711000892. Wang Hui and Huters 
Theodore. Chinas New Order: Society, Politics, and Economy in Transition. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2006.. 
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China.2 Mao’s philosophy of constant revolution and cult of personality was used to help 
consolidate China and establish sweeping reforms in China focused on central control of 
China, politically and economically.3 Mao viewed foreign thought as dangerous for China’s 
development.4 Deng’s revolution in China focused on pragmatism and embraced elements of 
capitalist practice.5 This still maintained China centric values and outlooks; the central 
government of China was viewed more as an overseer, instead of directly controlling China’s 
economy.6 Lastly, Xi’s revolution focuses on the advancement of China as a hegemonic 
power in Asia and a leader on the global stage by focusing on centralization of power; the 
Chinese government focused on increased unity and assimilationist policy to strengthen 
central control of China.7 This emphasis on Xi, as opposed to collective control by the CCP, 
has damaged the legitimacy of control in areas of China, such as Xinjiang, were Chinese 
national identity doesn’t have strong roots. The case of the Uighurs illustrates the tension 
between Uighur ethno-cultural identity and Chinese national identity. When the PRC took 
control of the Xinjiang region they were faced with a vastly different and diverse Uighur 
culture from their own.8 Islamic thought was the central factor unifying Uighur identity in the 
Xinjiang region.9 Uighurs became increasingly consolidated politically when faced with 
pressure from the PRC. The Uighurs have resisted Chinese rule in each period, but the 
method and intensity of Uighur resistance is framed by Chinese national identity. 
                                                 
2 Elizabeth C, Economy. "China's New Revolution." Foreign Affairs. March 06, 2019. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-04-17/chinas-new-revolution. (Accessed April 08, 2019). 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Bosely,Corey The Ethnic Minority Policies of the People’s’ Republic of China: Patronage and Prejudice, 8 
Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 291 (2007). 
9 Ibid., 219. 
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Ethnic minorities in China 
China has 55 ethnic groups that are officially recognized.10 These groups were 
selected out of over four hundred responses to a census put forward by the PRC in 1953.11  
The ethnic classification project carried out by the PRC has had lasting impacts on ethnic 
groups in China.12 China is a multiethnic nation.13 The Han Chinese are the majority ethnic 
group in China. The Han dominant nature in China takes the form of recognizing ethnic 
diversity but also adopting a posture that the non-Han population in China must embrace a 
Chinese national identity.14  Sinicizing, making ethnic groups more Chinese, is the method 
the PRC has employed to promote a Chinese national identity. Chinese national identity isn’t 
a static term. The process of othering in China is an ongoing process with deep historical 
roots.15 While minorities have been characterized by the PRC as backwards, feminine, and 
animalistic in China they have also served as bastions of authenticity for China during the 
1966-1976 Cultural Revolution.16 What it means to be Chinese has changed several times 
throughout the 20th century. If China considered ethnic groups to be Chinese or if they 
needed to be assimilated into the Han to be considered Chinese is a point of variance over 
each period of Chinese national identity. China today has been the focus of international 
attention both regarding its policies towards minorities and its emerging global power. The 
impact of Chinese national identity can be highlighted in the case of Uighurs in Xinjiang. It 
is important to not neglect the sheer size of China and the impact this has on Chinese politics. 
                                                 
10 Thomas, Mullaney. Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification and Scientific Statecraft in 
Modern China, 1928-1954. University of California Press, 2006. 3. 
11 Ibid., 2. 
12 Ibid., 5. 
13 Jennifer, Ang. "Sinicizing the Uyghurs." Peace Review 28, no. 4 (2016): 399-406.  
14 Ibid., 399. 
15 Schein Louisa and Luo Yu "Representations of Chinese Minorities" In Handbook on Ethnic Minorities in 
China, 263-290. Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016. 
16 Ibid., 264. 
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The diversity and number of people in China means the construction of a coherent identity is 
a consistent challenge. This is where the process of China engaging in assimilation policies 
can be seen as an effort to assert control over the various ethnicities in China. 
Many of the Uighurs in Xinjiang today are pushing for self-representation. Self-
representation, in ethnic groups, means having the ability to articulate an understanding of 
history and culture of their own ethnicity.17 In this way ethnic groups are able to frame their 
own identity, often as a counter to outside frames that label them as backwards or 
subservient.18 It is important when considering Chinese national identity that attention should 
be paid to Han Chauvinism.19 This is the belief that Han are culturally superior to other 
ethnic groups. Historically, Han chauvinism was heavily criticized by Mao Zedong as well as 
Zhou Enlai in 1950s.20 
The Xinjiang region 
Elmer identifies four reasons why China is involved in the Xinjiang Region. The 
territorial unity of China is a major factor driving China’s interest in the Xinjiang region.21 
This is in line with Chinese national identity in that China was weakened considerably in the 
past when it lost territorial control over regions of China, such as what occurred in the Qing 
dynasty.22 This relates to Elmer’s second reason for China’s interest of history and 
development.23 There is a humiliation narrative in China. This is because China faced severe 
                                                 
17 Barry, Sautman. "Self-representation and Ethnic Minority Rights in China." Asian Ethnicity 15, no. 2 (2014): 
174-96. doi:10.1080/14631369.2014.880588. 
18 Ibid., 176. 
19 Ibid., 177. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Franziska, Elmer (2011) “Tibet and Xinjiang: Their fourfold value to China,” Culture Mandala: The bulletin 
of the Centre for East-West Cultural and economic studies: Vol. 9: Iss 2, Article 1. 
22 Ibid., 5. 
23 Ibid., 6. 
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violations of its sovereignty at the hands of Western powers.24 The third reason is resource 
security.25 Xinjiang has served as a major route for raw resources that China needs for 
development.26 The last reason is geopolitics.27 Geopolitical issues relate the most directly to 
Chinese national identity. Increased conflicts in the Xinjiang region in recent years highlights 
the importance of understanding Chinese political action. China has millions in reeducation 
camps and a history of mass executions of Uighurs. Reeducation in China was an effort to 
force minorities to adopt an ideology in line with Chinese national identity. The way in 
which this was achieved varied as in response to the elite redefinition of Chinese national 
identity. Likewise, the methods employed to achieve reeducation varied. Mao emphasized 
reeducation through hard labor. Deng’s reeducation, ostensibly, meant a reeducation of how 
minority and Han identity could be compatible, ideally in a classroom setting. Lastly, 
reeducation under Xi has meant full assimilation with pro-China sentiments; forcing Muslim 
groups to eat pork or sing the praises of the CCP are some of the methods employed under 
Xi.28 China’s rise to power economically and politically means that there is more attention 
being placed on its treatment of minorities and its practices. It is important not to 
underestimate the differences historically and culturally between China and the rest of the 
world. The conflict between the Uighurs and Han goes back to before the 1800s and isn’t the 
result of China’s government today simply being repressive. China has reacted to the 
increased violence in Xinjiang with increasingly repressive measures designed assimilate 
Uighur populations. This impacts China’s broader policies towards minorities and, in 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 7. 
26 Ibid., 8. 
27 Ibid., 10. 
28 Gerry, Shih. "Muslims Forced to Drink Alcohol and Eat Pork in China’s’re-education' Camps, Former Inmate 
Claims." The Independent. May 19, 2018. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-re-education-
muslims-ramadan-xinjiang-eat-pork-alcohol-communist-xi-jinping-a8357966.html (Accessed April 15, 2019). 
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contemporary terms, affects its relations with other surrounding countries concerned that 
China will subsume their country under repressive policies. The Xinjiang region is a frontier 
for China and is important for China strategically and economically. Furthermore, the 
Uighur’s identity is problematic for China’s control of the region as Uighurs question the 
legitimacy of Chinese rule of Xinjiang. Therefore, China has a vested interest in projecting 
Chinese national identity into the Xinjiang region to help establish legitimacy. The case of 
the Uighurs in Xinjiang is an area where Chinese national identity is expressed clearly. By 
examining the case of the Uighurs since 1949 this case study can demonstrate the variance 
between Chinese national identity and policy towards Uighurs over three periods. 
Defining national identity  
The term Chinese national identity needs to be defined. Chinese national identity can 
be understood under many different frames, not all of which have to do with the national 
character of China. National identity in this context is the “distinctive set of ideals, myths, 
symbols, and values that can serve as the inspiration for a nation-state.”29 The relative weight 
of these factors can change over time. This is separate from ethnic, racial, and cultural 
identities in China. Nationalism is distinct from these other factors, in this case, because it 
defines the roles of leaders in China.30 The rise of the PRC in 1949 changed the way in which 
national identity was understood. The fall of the nationalists in China left a void in how 
China understood Chinese national identity. As national identity shifted, the elite in the CCP 
had the ability to drastically alter the way in which Chinese national identity was understood 
via the introduction of various new constitutions in China and white papers. This analysis is 
                                                 
29 Pye, "How China's Nationalism Was Shanghaied." In Chinese Nationalism, 186. 
30 Ibid., 87. 
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limited to understanding Chinese nationalism in the context of the People’s Republic of 
China, which gained control of China in 1949 and has maintained that control until the 
present. Likewise, cultural elements are introduced into this analysis of Chinese national 
identity using insights from Matten Andre’s work.31 Most notably, this analysis will expand 
upon elements of Chinese national identity as seen in the various Constitutions of China as 
well as the Chinese white papers, which are legal documents in China. The Chinese 
Constitution provides a way of measuring Chinese national identity as expressed by the elite 
members of the CCP. This will be contrasted with the policies put into effect in these periods 
that effected Uighurs in the Xinjiang region and the Uighur responses to these policies. 
Policies in each period of China are considered both when Uighurs are explicitly the target of 
the policy or if the policy had a wider effect on minorities in China. The role of the elites in 
the PRC suggests the importance of several key individuals over the three periods. Socialist 
China was dramatically impacted by Mao Zedong. Deng Xiaoping had a large degree of 
influence over China’s development in the post socialist period of China. Lastly, Xi Jinping 
adopted the centralization of power that Mao had institutionalized and Chinese national 
identity began to assume a more authoritarian and Han centric focus. 
                                                 
31 Marc Andre, Matten. Places of Memory in Modern China: History, Politics, and Identity. Leiden: Brill, 2014. 
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When discussing identity in the Socialist period of Chinese rule it is first important to 
understand the demonization of Mao in Western discourse and the effect this has had on 
understanding Chinese identity. Mao Zedong was born in 1893 in Shaoshan Hunan China. 
Vukovich refers to Mao as a specter that haunts how people view the PRC today.32 Zhikai 
Dong’s work focuses on how Mao helped lift China out of poverty and established the 
infrastructure for China’s development.33 Other authors focus on how China was devastated 
by the great leap forward in the late 1950s, which led to the death of millions of Chinese 
from starvation.34 Vukovich highlights how this event was used to discredit Chinese citizens 
as being backwards, gullible, unworthy, and having blind faith in Mao.35 What Vukovich 
highlights is that this perceived truth of Mao’s terrible leadership has led to its widespread 
acceptance among Western scholars eager to point out the flaws of China and ignoring any 
potential positives. This discourse is premised on the dismissal of Mao and a Chinese 
understanding of Mao.36 What Mao espoused was a widespread form of mass democracy for 
the people of China to work together in unity regardless of ethnicity.37 Very little effort is 
given to understand where Mao failed and where he succeeded in his management of China 
in a systematic way.38 Mao’s major revolution for China was implementing a policy of 
                                                 
32 Vukovich, China and Orientalism: Western Knowledge Production and the P.R.C, 78. 
33 Dong Zhikai. 2014. “Mao Zedong and the Independent and Comprehensive Industrial System and the 
Modernization of New China.” World Review of Political Economy 5 (4): 472–87. 
34 Vukovich, China and Orientalism: Western Knowledge Production and the P.R.C, 49. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 51. 
37 Ibid., 50. 
38 Ibid., 52. 
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constant revolution focused on radically changing class relations throughout China.39 
Keeping China in a state of flux helped ensure that it wouldn’t fall prey to outside forces that 
could hamper China’s development.40 
Han Suyin was born in 1912 and died in 2012 making her a contemporary of Mao and 
Deng Xiaoping. Han Suyin’s maiden name was Rosalie Chou but she adopted a Chinese 
pseudonym Han Suyin. She was best known for her sentimental semi-autobiographical novel 
A Many-Splendoured Thing.41 What makes this figure important for understanding Chinese 
identity during this time is that her work connected elements of Europe and China from both 
a Han standpoint and a Hakka Chinese standpoint.42 The Hakka Chinese are an ethnic group 
in China that has migrated extensively in and outside of China.43 Hakka Chinese have robust 
connections in China, the United States, and Taiwan.44 This makes them uniquely positioned 
as an ethnic group being both an insider and outsider to Chinese identity.45 Han Suyin’s 
positive comments on Mao Zedong’s rule and in particular the importance of self-reliance 
and avoiding a victim mentality helped shaped discourse in China regarding ethnic 
minorities.46 One of the major critiques Han Suyin had of Western opinions of China was the 
view in the West that certain ethnic groups had less intelligence and capacity than 
Europeans.47 Mao Zedong was not a flawless leader in China but the premise of needing 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Florence Kuek and Fan Pik Wah. 2014. “Rosalie or Not Rosalie: Han Suyin’s Ethical Identity and Ethical 
Choices in the Crippled Tree Series.” Forum for World Literature Studies 6 (2): 200–217. 
42 Ibid., 201. 
43 Shu-ju Chi, Ann and Wei-An Chang. 2018. “Hakka American Associations and Their Online Discourses: A 
Case Study of the Taiwan Council Global Website.” Chinese America: History & Perspectives, January 81–90. 
44 Ibid., 82. 
45 Ibid., 83. 
46 Kuek and Wah, “Rosalie or Not Rosalie: Han Suyin’s Ethical Identity and Ethical Choices in the Crippled 
Tree Series,” 204. 
47 Ibid., 207. 
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revolution from all people, in particular the importance of the agricultural sector and ethnic 
minorities, in China struck a chord with the people of China.48 
Chinese national identity from 1945-1975: the socialist period 
The PRC in 1949 considered nationality policy to be of the upmost importance.49 A 
central goal of the CCP was to establish legitimacy through the use of constant revolution as 
a way of reforming China and increasing state capacity. The takeover by the PRC in China in 
1949 provides a starting point for the shifts brought about in the 1954 Constitution of 
China.50 Chinese national identity under the CCP has prioritized the role of the party as the 
final determinant of national identity. It is important to note that the Uighur populations in 
Xinjiang were not monolithic in belief and many had differing views of how citizens should 
relate to government.51 China’s conception of self was counter to the Muslim groups in 
Xinjiang that enjoyed brief independence in the 1940s.52 However, the 1954 Constitution of 
China expressed relatively positive sentiments towards minority groups. Article three shows 
the spirit of acceptance clearly. 
Article 3 The People's Republic of China is a single multi-national state. 
All the nationalities are equal. Discrimination against, or oppression of, any nationality, and 
acts which undermine the unity of the nationalities are prohibited. 
All the nationalities have freedom to use and foster the growth of their spoken and written 
languages, and to preserve or reform their own customs or ways. 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 208. 
49 Xiaohui.Wu "From Assimilation to Autonomy: Realizing Ethnic Minority Rights in Chinas National 
Autonomous Regions." Chinese Journal of International Law13, no. 1 (2014): 55-90. 
doi:10.1093/chinesejil/jmu006. 
50 Ibid., 6. 
51 Ibid. 
52 "Xinjiang Territory Profile." BBC News. October 12, 2018. Accessed March 25, 2019. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16860974. 
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Regional autonomy applies in areas where people of national minorities in compact 
communities. National autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's 
Republic of China.53 
What this shows is that the Chinese Constitution had broad reaching rights. However, 
this understanding should be tempered with the knowledge that China also considered the 
coming together of ethnic groups as a natural result of Stalin-Leninist principles.54 China 
during this time was widely tolerant of minority groups in China.55  In 2011 the Han 
nationality in China comprised around 91.51 percent of the Chinese population with ethnic 
minorities making up around 8.49 percent.56  
Dreyer’s work regarding the CCP suggests that the reason for the easier integration of 
minorities into the constitution of the CCP was due to need of the support of the working 
class in China.57 This is a factor highlighted in the Constitution of China (1954) in articles 
one and two. 
Article 1 The People's Republic of China is a people's democratic state led by the working 
class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. 
Article 2 All power in the People's Republic of China belongs to the people. The Organs 
through which the people exercise power are the National People's Congress and the 
local people's congresses.58 
The National People's Congress, the local people's congresses and other organs of state 
practice democratic centralism. 
 It is important to note that the tone of optimism and that the people could work 
together to right the wrongs in the world was pervasive in China at this time. The specter of 
Han domination was still keen in the mind of minority groups and offsetting this fear was a 
                                                 
53 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1954), Henceforth referred to as the 1954 Constitution. 
54 Wu, "From Assimilation to Autonomy: Realizing Ethnic Minority Rights in Chinas National Autonomous 
Regions," 65. 
55 Ibid., 67. 
56 Ibid., 57. 
57 Ibid., 63. 
58 1954 Constitution 
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major goal of the CCP.59 Socialist China valued Leninist nationality policy which supported 
the right of minorities to secede.60 However, this focus shifted with the rise of Mao Zedong 
in the CCP in 1935, who focused more on a united front where minorities had a right to self-
govern within a unified state. 
 Protections for minority groups were forefront in Chinese law during the socialist 
period of CCP rule. While the strength of the commitment is commendable, this doesn’t 
necessarily mean that the situation on the ground reflected these values. The protections of 
minorities in China were still extensive. The Common Programme promulgated in 1949 
disavowed discrimination against ethnicities and splitting unity among them. This was 
particularly evident in articles 51, 52, and 53. 
Article 50 All nationalities within the boundaries of the People's Republic of China are 
equal. They shall establish unity and mutual aid among themselves, and shall oppose 
imperialism and their own public enemies, so that the People's Republic of China will 
become a big fraternal and co-operative family composed of all its nationalities. 61 
Greater Nationalism and chauvinism shall be opposed. Acts involving discrimination, 
oppression and splitting of the unity of the various nationalities shall be prohibited.62 
Article 51 Regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where national minorities are 
concentrated, and various kinds of autonomy organizations of the different 
nationalities shall be set up according to the size of the respective populations and 
regions. In places where different nationalities live together and in the autonomous 
areas of the national minorities, the different nationalities shall each have an 
appropriate number of representatives in the local organs of political power.63 
Article 53. All national minorities shall have freedom to develop their dialects and 
languages, to preserve or reform their traditions, customs and religious beliefs. The 
People's Government shall assist the masses of the people of all national minorities to 
develop their political, economic, cultural and educational construction work.64 
                                                 
59 Ibid. 
60 Wu, "From Assimilation to Autonomy: Realizing Ethnic Minority Rights in Chinas National Autonomous 
Regions," 63. 
61 The Common Programme 1949. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
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This provided legal protections for ethnic minorities regarding ethnicity and 
language. One of the major architects of including this change into the Common Programme 
of China was Li Weihan.65 This type of autonomy was best characterized as limited 
administrative autonomy.66 The General Programme for the Implementation of Regional 
Autonomy stipulated that the autonomous regions in China needed to be approved by the 
central government of China.67 This did allow for local security forces in these regions and 
that minority groups should be the primary members of the government in these regions as 
well.68 This provided rather comprehensive protections for minorities in that it lays out very 
particular ways in which the protections should be translated into practice. From 1955 to 
1965, in addition to Inner Mongolia, there were other autonomous regions set up.69 Some of 
the more notable today are the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous region and the Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region.70 By the end of 1965, there were a total of 29 autonomous prefectures 
and 64 autonomous counties or leagues and 35 different ethnicities had their own 
autonomous region.71 What this suggests is that China during its socialist period translated its 
legal protections for minorities into reality. While there were doubtless cases of Han 
Chauvinism in China during this time, the commitment of China to helping ameliorate these 
issues was more than just rhetoric. However, it could be questioned as to what extent the 
autonomous regions of China during this time reflected the values it espoused. To better 
understand this, the example of the autonomous region of Xinjiang and the Uighur 
populations therein can be examined. 
                                                 
65 Hongyi, Lai. "Ethnic Autonomous Regions and the Unitary Multi-ethnic Nation-state." In Handbook on 
Ethnic Minorities in China, 138-64. Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016. 
66 Ibid., 141. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., 142. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
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 Uighur response to policies in socialist China 
While the period from 1949 to 1975 is considered legally as one in which minorities 
were relatively tolerated in China there could be a question to how this translated into 
reality.72 There was a relative sensitivity to issues as China reaffirmed its commitment to 
minority issues. The People’s Republic of China took control of the Xinjiang region in 1949. 
While the communist party and Mao Zedong decried the Han centric view of Xinjiang, the 
narratives of the local Uighurs and their historic control over the Xinjiang Region were 
subsumed within a Chinese narrative that highlights China’s right to control the region.73 It is 
important to note that the Xinjiang region lies on the Northwestern border of China and 
makes up relatively 1,600,000 square kilometers of China.74 In addition, Xinjiang has borders 
with Mongolia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.75 In 
1955, Xinjiang was declared to be an autonomous region showing China’s commitment to 
respecting minority rights.76 Russia’s conquest of the bordering states of Kokand and 
Bukhara made China more concerned about losing influence in the Xinjiang region.77 The 
Soviet Union supported a Uighur led separatist movement in 1944-1949 leading to the 
establishment of the East Turkestan Republic.78 This historical independence of the region 
from China and its proximity to Mongolia helped push Chinas efforts to establish a strategy 
for control of the region. The Uighurs response to China’s policies of constant revolution was 
                                                 
72 Vukovich, China and Orientalism: Western Knowledge Production and the P.R.C, 24. 
72 Ibid., 25. 
73 Ang, "Sinicizing the Uyghurs," 400. 
74 Michael Dillon "Xinjiang and the Uyghurs" In Handbook on Ethnic Minorities in China, 60-82 Cheltenham, 
Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016. 
75 Ibid., 61. 
76 Ibid. 
77 "Xinjiang Territory Profile." BBC News. 
78 Ibid. 
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increasing violence as rules were increasingly applied arbitrarily towards minorities during 
the Cultural Revolution in 1966-1976.79  
The peaceful liberation of the region in 1949 by the PRC was contested by its mostly 
Muslim Uighur population as a hostile takeover by a communist power.80 China’s control of 
the region historically has been marred by conflict with the local Uighur populations. The 
Uighur narrative of events differs in key areas from the PRC’s account in that China’s 
control of the Xinjiang region was only tentative and the legitimacy of which has been called 
into question. It is important to understand that while Chinese policy may have had several 
key protections for the Uighurs in Xinjiang it never questioned China’s right to sovereignty 
over the Xinjiang region. A key point of contention is that Chinese scholarly narratives 
suggest that the Uighurs have only 3800-3900 years of history in the region. This can be 
contrasted with the view from Uighur scholars that suggest instead that they have a 6400-
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year history.81 A key point to China legitimizing its takeover in 1949 was that the Han were 
indigenous to the region and Uighurs arrived later from Mongolia. Uighur historian Turgun 
Almas has traced the history of the Uighurs back to the Xinjiang region arguing it was 
always the Uighur homeland. Other Uighur historians go even further connecting Uighurs 
with Turkish roots such as what was suggested by Muhemmed Imin Bughra and that the 
Uighurs have a 9000-year history in the region.82 These different accounts are of key 
importance when considering Chinese national identity during the socialist period as 
espoused by Mao Zedong. There was a respect for diversity, but this was predicated on the 
idea of a united front, which the Uighurs ethno-religious claims to political power in the 
region threatened.83 Books in 1949 that spread this view of history were banned in China and 
the Chinese language Mandarin was used to replace local Uighur dialects as the language in 
regional administrations.84 In an interesting twist of understanding, by tying the historical 
control of the region to Han Chinese that were displaced from the region by the Uighurs 
China managed to uphold most of its constitutional wording on respecting minority rights by 
reestablishing control of the region. In many ways, Han-Centrism and bringing prosperity to 
the region during the socialist period were in line with each other.85  
 The violent resistance of the Xinjiang region to the PRC takeover in 1949 was not 
surprising as many Uighurs felt their own right to self-govern had been coopted by Chinese 
rule. Part of this was due to perceived religious persecution. The number of Mosques in 1949 
is estimated to be around 29,545 and this number fell to around 14,119 at the start of the 
Cultural Revolution, which was roughly from 1966-76. To further characterize Chinese rule 
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of the Xinjiang region over time it is important to understand how this led to the mass exodus 
of the people of Xinjiang to the Soviet Union. To better visualize what this meant for the 
population of Xinjiang and the conflict between the Han and Uighur groups in Xinjiang it is 
useful to look at the percent of different ethnic groups in the Xinjiang region. 
What this shows is that the number of Uighurs in the Xinjiang region dropped 
drastically after the PRC took power in 1949. This was due in part to policies that 
encouraged Han migration to the Xinjiang region as well as policies that encouraged Uighurs 
to leave the Xinjiang region. This leads to the apparent contradiction in Chinese policy 
towards the Uighurs where at the same time ethnic diversity is encouraged and supported 
constitutionally the Uighur ethnic identity was being neutered by migration and Chinese 
control. Uighur’s have had mixed reactions to China’s efforts during the socialist period. 
This was a time of reform in China, where minorities received more rights, but also a time in 
Demographic 
profile of 
Xinjiang 
1945 1982 1996 2008 
Total(million) 
 
3.6 13.1 16.8 21.3 
Han (percent) 
 
6.2 40.3 41.1 39.2 
Uighur (percent) 
 
82.7 45.7 50.6 46.1 
Hui (percent) 
 
2.8 4.3 4.9 4.5 
Kazak (percent) 1.1 6.9 8.0 7.1 
Other (percent) 
 
7.2 2.8 2.8 3.1 
Source: Howell, Fan, Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang, 
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which Mao Zedong established the reeducation through hard labor programs in China.86 The 
intention in Xinjiang was political indoctrination, as opposed to extermination, but many 
Uighurs violently resisted China’s efforts to assimilate Uighurs.87 Likewise, many of the 
mass mobilization programs, such as the Great Leap Forward, ended up effecting the lives of 
minorities in Xinjiang.88 However, the popularity of Mao helped offset these policies and 
allow for time for China to correct.89 These policies did increase Uighur resistance to 
Chinese rule, although this resistance was mostly nonviolent.90 
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Deng Xiaoping was born in 1904 in Paifang, Guang’an County, Sichuan.91 Deng 
Xiaoping travelled to France in 1920 for work.92 Likewise, Deng joined a youth Chinese 
communist party in 1923 where Zhou Enlai was the party secretary.93 The rise of Deng 
Xiaoping is a key factor to understanding politics in post socialist China. Vukovich argues 
that the rise of Deng in the late 1970s led to the “de-maoification” of China.94 This was due 
in part to outside pressure to make China appear more willing to deal with its Western 
counterparts. The conception of China by Western sources at the time of Deng’s rise to 
power was that China was becoming like the West and adopting models of civil society.95 
The concept of modernity was used to suggest that China was following along the path of the 
United States. What Deng learned abroad was that European industrialists were humiliating 
China.96 Deng later protested that British forces had fired on Chinese student demonstrators 
which later made him a target for arrest for organizing workers in China.97 In 1969, Deng 
was sent to be reeducated with hard labor to better understand Mao Zedong’s thought.98 
Deng’s rise to power later in the 1970s was due in part to his connections to Zhou Enlai who 
held a powerful position in the CCP.99 Deng focused heavily on consolidating power in 
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China both militarily and for its citizens.100 A major factor here was the removal of 
overlapping jurisdictions that stood in the way of railway development.101 Deng was 
uniquely positioned in that he had faced persecution from Western sources and from Mao as 
well. Deng’s powerful connections in the CCP and his willingness to embrace diaspora 
populations of China showed a level of intergenerational thinking necessary to bolster 
China’s long term development.102  
Mao stated during the Cultural Revolution that it was supposed to bring about “great 
chaos leading to great rule,” but instead it served to invalidate many of the laws surrounding 
minority rights.103 This was attributed to the “Gang of Four,” a group of four ultra-leftists in 
the CCP that were primarily blamed for the Cultural Revolution.104 The subsequent trials and 
execution of the Gang of Four helped pave the way for the rise of Deng in China.105 This left 
the CCP in crisis and many of the ideological underpinnings of the CCP were losing favor 
with the elite.106 The leftist thinking in China was replaced by an understanding of the 
limitations of Mao’s rule. What this meant for China was a drastic reimagining of the role the 
CCP. First and foremost was an emphasis on equality before the law.107 Likewise, foreigners 
were no longer the enemy.108 Deng said that Mao was 70 percent right and 30 percent 
wrong.109 The absence of Mao has allowed increased regional assertiveness as the CCP no 
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longer will blame a region for getting ahead of the rest of the country.110 The death of Mao 
left a void in Chinese leadership.111 After Mao’s death, many high-level Chinese officials 
went on foreign tours to study methods of governance.112 Deng believed that the need for 
unity and strength in China called for a strong hand and a willingness to do what needed to 
be done. The Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 highlights this point.113 Deng had set up a 
new leadership structure for China prior to the worst of the violence breaking out in 
Tiananmen as well as picking officials who would be the least associated with the violence to 
be put into positions of authority.114 Deng believed that the West would forget the violence in 
the region and that economic programs based on freedom would still be expanded.115 What 
this shows for Chinese identity is that Deng was willing to engage in extreme measures to 
enact change in China. As Deng distanced China more and more from Marxist-Leninist 
thought China began to develop a governance style of its own. Ethnic minorities and diaspora 
groups were useful for China in so far as they helped inform Chinese governance and 
reinterpreted the unity of the party and country. Deng’s modernizations in China were 
tempered with the centrality of the CCP in mind. 
The political process in China had begun to take on a post-ideological flavor.116 1979 
was the first year, since the liberation in 1949, in which there was no class-related political 
campaign ongoing in China. Mao’s constant revolution was replaced in China by more stable 
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rules.117 Terrill Ross provides a succinct summary of the major changes in post socialist 
china. 
“First, people high and low see economic growth as China's highest priority. In the factories 
the slogans are about output, product quality and competitions between teams of 
workers: the conversations in the canteens are about pay packets and what to spend 
them on. Some private enterprise is returning to the cities, to provide much desired 
special products and services, and to alleviate an increasingly serious unemployment 
problem. The spirit of industry has been galvanized by the assertion from on high that 
profit and market response are the only valid measures of industrial performance.” 
If Mao was an example of constant revolution and attention focused on 
disenfranchised groups, then Deng was an excellent example of pragmatism with a focus on 
economic transformation, which was the strategy that informed Deng’s rise. As Mao kept 
losing sway with the Chinese political elite Chinese national identity began shifting to ideas 
espoused by Deng Xiaoping. China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 helping 
further demonstrate its increased connection to the global community. Deng reformed China 
and helped open it up to the rest of the world.  
Chinese national identity from 1975-2010: the post socialist period 
Chinese national identity shifts in the post socialist period. National identity is often 
understood in political terms. Ernest Gellner argues that social ties connected to the division 
of labor is what leads to the bureaucratic state.118  Hobsbawm suggests that nature of states 
are fragile and in flux.119 As national identity reaches into myths and symbols of society it is 
also impacted by economics.120 In the case of China, this becomes clear when considering 
Deng Xiaoping’s famous quote suggesting that it doesn’t matter what the color of the cat is 
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as long as it catches mice. Economic identity didn’t entail becoming like the West but instead 
becoming a powerful communist country that employed some capitalist practices.121  
The 1975 Constitution of China helps demonstrate how Chinese national identity 
shifted during this period. 
Article 4  
The People’s Republic of China is a unitary Multi-national state. The areas where regional 
national autonomy is exercised are all inalienable parts of the People’s Republic of 
China. All the Nationalities are equal. Big-nationality chauvinism and local -
nationality chauvinism must be opposed. All the Nationalities have the freedom to 
use their own spoken and written languages.122 
This constitution was further amended in 1978 with the advent of the Third Plenum of 
the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP.123 While this may have seemed very similar to 
the prior constitution, this version removed several minority rights. For example, regional 
autonomy was severely curtailed.124 Likewise, the use of minority languages was no longer 
fostered and grown inside of the autonomous regions. This trend shifted as Chinese national 
identity became more pragmatic.125 In 1979 autonomous regions with a sizable minority 
population were required to set up Ethnic Affairs Commissions.126 However, it is important 
to note that this change had multiple effects on minority populations in China. As the 
changes in China were more pragmatic in nature, they did have positive effects for 
minorities. There was an increased effort to educate minority groups as well as engage 
minorities in governance. China had started to create an additional economic element to 
Chinese national identity.127 George T. Crane highlights this point helping trace how the 
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demise of Mao and the rise of Deng in China helped change the way in which China viewed 
itself.128 Mao’s utopian rhetoric was replaced with a colder view of the realities in China, 
even more so in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward in China.129 Special economic 
zones were developed to open society. China implemented special economic zones, but this 
required a shift in identity for socialist China.130 The Marxist-Leninist practices of China and 
redefining of China by Deng Xiaoping helped shape Chinese national identity.131 The 
policies put forward from China during this time were not a complete departure from how 
Chinese national identity was understood in the past. The factors that influence national 
identity are multifaceted and rooted in history and Mao’s understanding of socialist China 
was not entirely abandoned.132 What this means is that Chinese identity is informed by the 
historic elements of China as well as the economic realities during the 1970s. 
This highlights the Chinese mentality of this time as it incorporates Western advances 
with a Chinese heart.133 Sometimes referred to as the policy of walking on two legs, one 
Western and one Chinese, this shift in identity can be seen in the Chinese constitution. 
Articles three through five of the 1982 Constitution highlight this point. 
Article 3  
The State organs of the People’s Republic of China apply the principle of democratic 
centralism.  
The National People’s Congress and the local people’s congresses at various levels are 
constituted through democratic elections. They are responsible to the people and 
subject to their supervision. 
All administrative, judicial and procedural organs of the State are created by the people’s 
congresses to which they are responsible and by which they are supervised. 
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The division of functions and powers between the central and local State organs is guided by 
the principle of giving full scope to the initiative and enthusiasm of the local 
authorities under the unified leadership of the central authorities. 
Article 4  
All nationalities in the people’s republic of china are equal. the state protects the lawful rights 
and interests of the minority nationalities and upholds and develops a relationship of 
equality, unity and mutual assistance among all of china’s nationalities. 
discrimination against and oppression of any nationality are prohibited; any act which 
undermines the unity of the nationalities or instigates division is prohibited. 
The state assists areas inhabited by minority nationalities in accelerating their economic and 
cultural development according to the characteristics and needs of the various 
minority nationalities. 
Regional autonomy is practiced in areas where people of minority nationalities live in 
concentrated communities; in these areas organs of self-government are established to 
exercise the power of autonomy. all national autonomous areas are integral parts of 
the people’s republic of china. 
All nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages 
and to preserve or reform their own folkways and customs. 
Article 5  
the people’s republic of china governs the country according to law and makes it a socialist 
country under rule of law. 
The state upholds the uniformity and dignity of the socialist legal system. 
No laws or administrative or local regulations may contravene the constitution. 
all state organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public organizations and all 
enterprises and institutions must abide by the constitution and other laws. all acts in 
violation of the Constitution or other laws must be investigated. 
As can be seen, many of the protections for minorities were reinstated in 1982. In 
many ways, this even expanded previous protections as well.134 However, it did take some 
time for many of these ideas to be formalized in China. Many autonomous regions in China 
didn’t have their own regulations on ethnic groups until 1991.135 Ethnic groups had certain 
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taxes waived and the number of ethnic minorities in the national legislature changed from 9.4 
percent to 14.9 percent in 1988. This could be considered one of the most tolerant times for 
ethnic minorities in China. Hu Yaobang the General Secretary of the CCP in 1980-1994 
espoused the view was that it was only with genuine autonomy that the unity of China could 
be achieved.136 The 1984 Law on National Regional Autonomy granted further rights to 
minority groups.137 
However, it is important to understand that the goal of unity was the primary aim. 
The failures of Mao impacted how China viewed itself.138 Chinese policies during these 
times were not a concession to Capitalism but a reinvention of China on its own terms to help 
combat the failures and fear of domination by outside powers.139 Much of this even built off 
the previous socialist period as the constant revolution espoused by Mao was reinvented in an 
evolving picture of how China viewed itself.140 What this suggests is that understanding 
China as it did itself during this period provides other insights to understanding Chinese 
political action. The symbols and myths in China evolved over time. Making China into 
something unique to China was a dominating theme of the post socialist period.141  
Uighur response to policies in post socialist China 
Economic policies regarding Uighurs reflected Chinese national identity. Ethnic 
minorities were not limited by the same one child policy in China and likewise received 
favorable treatment from the government over Han groups to preserve ethnic unity.142 The 
Anti-Poverty plans of 1994-1996 had multiple effects on the autonomous regions of China. 
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They helped develop the regions more rapidly leading to growth but also increased tensions 
in the region due to the influx of massive amounts of Han into autonomous regions.143  This 
also saw the removal of many of the rights granted to these regions.144 The Western 
Developmental Programme launched in 2000 was aimed at assisting the development of 
minority regions.145 Uighur resistance to these programs was based on the fact they elevated 
Han Chinese over Uighurs.146 The Uighurs lacked much of the development that the Eastern 
regions of China had. Therefore, the rapid industrialization of Xinjiang was accompanied by 
an influx of Han Chinese that served as overseers for the development in the region.147 This 
led to an intensification of Uighur violence towards Han Chinese. 
The Strike Hard campaign started in 1996 and was a response to ethnic violence in 
Xinjiang.148 This led to the mass arrest and execution of Uighurs and some sources believe 
that there were secret trials and executions of Uighurs deemed dangerous.149 The streets of 
Yining became extremely violent in 1997 with the Chinese government attempting to 
disperse riots in the area.150 China officially places the deaths at 200 by the police and 
military and claim it was an effort to prevent violence against Han Chinese in the area. 
However, some eyewitness reports place the number of casualties much higher in the 
1000s.151 This led to retaliation bombings in Urumqi several days later by separatist groups 
in Xinjiang.152 These increased tensions soured the relations of Han and Uighurs even 
further. Likewise, Uighur education started to become increasingly defined by the promotion 
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of a pro-China narrative.153 The State Administration for Religious Affairs, established in 
1998, explicitly forced all Muslim organizations to register with the government.154 
The Xinjiang Class was a Uighur reeducation program designed to increase the 
education level of Uighurs in Xinjiang established in the 2000s. This program demonstrates 
the failures in China to put the revised Constitution of China in 1982 into practice. This 
program provided economic aid for Uighurs seeking higher education. Notably, education 
levels of Uighurs have gone up since 1982 with an increase in attendance of Uighurs in 
primary school from 37 to 43 percent from 1982-1990.155 Illiteracy dropped from 45 to 26.6 
percent during the same time.156 China implemented several other policies including 
lowering the entrance exam requirements for Uighurs as well as introducing quotas for the 
number of Uighurs in higher education in Xinjiang.157 The curriculum of the class was 
designed to foster pro-China sentiments among students as Article one and ten of the 
Xinjiang class states.  
Article One  
in order for Xinjiang to train qualified high school graduates who support the Chinese 
Communist Party’s leaders, love China, love socialism, defend the unity of China, 
maintain unity of the people ... and will bring forth new a spirit, realize ability, and 
are determined to offer one’s self for socialist modernization construction, the 
Xinjiang Class must fully carry out the national education and ethnic group policies 
[and] carry out quality education. 
Article Ten  
Xinjiang Class schools will adhere to socialist principles; emphasize moral education work, 
Marxism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiao Ping Theory and the Party’s theory on 
ethnic problems as a guide ... [and]special attention [will be] placed on strengthening 
support for the Chinese Communist Party, love for the socialist motherland, 
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upholding the unity of China’s Nationalist education, to strengthen education of the 
unity of peoples—i.e. Han are inseparable from ethnic minorities, ethnic minorities 
are inseparable from Han, and every ethnic minority is inseparable from each other.158  
What each of these articles articulates is that this program is an excellent example of 
how Chinese national identity was translated into policies for minorities during this time. It 
demonstrates a combination of the practicality of educating minorities but also a mindfulness 
of the centrality of China and the lack of respect for minority groups as China often outright 
banned the use of minority languages.159 This reflects the policies of segregation that China 
has put into place. The reality of the interaction between Uighur and Han students was 
limited, as often ethnic lines created a social boundary among the students.160 What this 
demonstrates is that there was shift in Chinese identity during this time that led to the 
lessening of Maoist policies in China. The disillusionment of China with the charismatic rule 
of Mao combined with the rise of capitalist practices lessened Chinese legitimacy in the 
Xinjiang region. To counteract this, China implemented policies such as the Xinjiang class to 
help indoctrinate Uighurs in pro China sentiments. This was widely unsuccessful as the case 
of the Xinjiang class demonstrates. This is because China’s increased scrutiny over the 
region helped solidify Uighur dissent to Chinese rule against a common enemy. The influx of 
Han into Xinjiang also helped increase Uighur dissent to Chinese rule.161 Uighur’s blamed 
the Han for increased unemployment.162 Deng’s modernizations in China helped usher in 
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new developmental programs but many of these were run by Han Chinese.163 This led to 
periodic attacks of Hans by Uighurs in the Xinjiang region and helped justify some of the 
Chinese government’s later more repressive policies.164 
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Xi Jinping took power in 2013 in China replacing Hu Jintao who was the defacto 
leader in China from 2003-2013. It was during this time from the early 2000s to Xi taking 
power that much of the narrative surrounding minorities changed in China. There was a shift 
towards coercive assimilation. It was during this transition when much of the discussion 
surrounding China from Western sources changed.165 The new narrative was of assertiveness 
in China and increased repression and human rights violations.166 Alastair Johnston finds two 
major issues with this narrative. Firstly, it ignores the past policies China has had regarding 
sovereignty and territory, and secondly it misreads many of the issues in China today.167 A 
major issue is that there is no accepted typology for assertiveness from which China can be 
compared going into Xi’s rule as opposed to before.168 Johnston’s work goes on to suggest 
that it was the expansion of the U.S activities into China that forced them to define hard 
lines.169 Furthermore, North Korea’s increased activity during 2010 and onward only served 
to highlight China’s default stance on the issue.170 The increased interaction with North 
Korea, by the global community, has given China more chances to interact with North Korea. 
This can be seen in the recent nuclear power programs created in North Korea inciting 
international concern. 
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Xi launched what he referred to as the “third revolution” in China.171 While Mao has 
brought about a communist revolution and Deng an economic revolution, Xi is attempting to 
usher in an era of regional hegemony for China.172 China is an illiberal state seeking 
leadership in a liberal world system.173 Furthermore, Xi’s centralization of power has 
undermined the collective leadership style in Deng’s era and instead promoted the centrality 
of Xi to decision making in China.174 Elizabeth C. Economy highlights this point succinctly. 
“Xi has matched the dramatic growth of his personal power with an equally dramatic 
intensification of the CCP’s power in society and the economy. The China scholar 
David Shambaugh once noted, “If one of the hallmarks of the Maoist state was the 
penetration of society, then the Dengist state was noticeable for its withdrawal.” Now, 
under Xi, the pendulum has swung back toward a greater role for the party. No 
element of political and economic life has remained untouched.” 
What this demonstrates is that Xi is accelerating efforts during the later parts of Hu 
Jintao’s rule in that China is now actively seeking to impact global norms and values; 
systematically inserting itself on the global stage.175 
Chinese national identity from 2010-2019: China post-Deng 
Chinese national identity shifted under Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping.  Hu Jintao oversaw 
a period where party oversight was loosened, and China was increasingly placed on the 
global stage as a more dynamic China. Most notably, China has been strengthening its central 
government and the removal of term limits for the president suggests a connection between 
Mao’s self-aggrandizement and Xi today. 
China has attempted to increase its regional power in Asia. This has been done 
through an increased emphasis on the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank as an 
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alternative to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.176 Furthermore, China’s 
New Belt and New Road initiative is also being used to promote China as a leader in trade.177 
The Xinjiang region is vital for the development of this initiative as well as helping increase 
the economic development of Western regions of China. The Uighur situation in Xinjiang 
reflects the changing nature of Chinese national identity from post socialist to a post-Deng 
era. While the Chinese constitution didn’t shift there was the distribution of a secret 
document to top Chinese officials. Known as “document NO. 7,” it was promulgated in 
China in 1996 but was put into effect mostly during the later parts of Hu Jintao’s rule and 
later by Xi Jinping. The effects of this document supersede the Constitution of China and it 
provides a window to understand how elite viewpoint of Chinese national identity shifted 
post-Deng. This document offered an ominous view of the Xinjiang region, as excerpts from 
the first section show. 
1. Ideological unity, consciousness-raising, leadership strengthening, and a clear sense 
of duty are necessary… we have to bear in mind that national separatism and illegal 
religious activity are the main threats to the stability of Xinjiang. The main problem is 
that international counter-revolutionary forces led by the United States of America 
are openly supporting the separatist activities inside and outside of Xinjiang. The 
outside national separatist organizations are joining hands and strengthening the 
infiltration of Xinjiang sabotage activities with each passing day. Within our national 
borders, illegal religious activities are widespread; sabotaging activities such as the 
instigation of problematic situations, the breaking-and entering of party government 
offices and explosions and terrorism are occurring sporadically. Some of these 
activities have changed from completely hidden to semi-open activities, even to the 
degree of openly challenging the government’s authority…On every level party 
committees and the people’s government and concerned branches have to adhere to 
Deng Xiaoping's theory of building China-style socialism and the Party's basic 
principles and guiding policy; foresee possible dangers; dam the river before the 
floods come; correctly handle the relationship between reform, development and 
stability. On every level party and government leaders need to create a responsible 
order in defending ethnic unity and social stability and perfect it while holding high 
the banner of defending ethnic unity and honor of the law with great political 
sensitivity and pride, unify to the greatest level the cadres and people of every 
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nationality and depend on them to alienate as much as possible the very small number 
of ethnic separatists and criminals who commit serious crimes and strike hard against 
them, thus reinforcing the work of defending stability in all fields. 
This assessment shows that the CCP in China was focused upon ensuring that state 
authority would assist itself against any “flood” of opposition. Likewise, it viewed separatist 
elements in China as a real and present danger to stability in China. Deng’s pragmatism isn’t 
abandoned here but takes on a darker tone. This was referred to in China as the method of 
“dam the river before the floods come.” The United States ignored human rights in abuses in 
China after the 2001 terror attack in the United States made them accepting of extreme 
measures to fight terror.178 The United States assisted China with problematic Uighurs as a 
report on the Subcommittee on International Organization, Human rights, and Oversight in 
the United States showed. 17 Uighurs were held in Guantanamo bay by the United States. 
This support was premised on helping fight terrorism globally and was in response to the 
2001 September 11th terror attack in the United States.179 Document NO.7 demonstrates the 
major fears of the CCP and the issue of religion in the Xinjiang region. The rise of terrorism 
worldwide made the Chinese elite particularly cognizant of the danger of Muslim belief in 
Xinjiang and its ability to connect with outside extremist groups. Likewise, this document 
explicitly undid many of the protections for minority, groups giving regional power 
structures in China approval to discriminate against minorities deemed threatening to 
Chinese national identity. 
Some explanations of this increased repression are hinged upon the idea of hyper 
nationalism becoming the norm in China today. Johnston’s work suggests that this rising 
                                                 
178 Shaoying, Zhang, and Derek McGhee. Social Policies and Ethnic Conflict in China: Lessons from Xinjiang. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
179 The Uighurs: A History of Persecution: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, 
Human Rights, and Oversight of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred 
Eleventh Congress, First Session, June 10, 2009. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2009. 
35 
 
nationalism in China isn’t new. His work uses a time series survey dataset from Beijing to 
show that the level of nationalism in China isn’t rising and instead the youth of China have 
less nationalistic tendencies than the older generations.180 Johnston makes use of five 
different tests. These tests measure the level of pride in nation and blind support for the state, 
identity differences with Japanese and Americans, if extreme views are becoming more 
common, hostility to other major powers, and the connection between nationalism and age.181 
Johnson adapts these tests for the Chinese context. The results of these surveys suggest that 
there hasn’t been a radical increase in nationalistic tendencies in China.182 What this means 
for this understanding is that China’s policies towards minorities are not fueled by a blind 
belief in Han superiority or hyper national sentiments. This is an important factor to consider 
as this is contrary to conventual wisdom regarding China that its oppressive policies are 
simply a result of nationalism getting out of hand.183 
This was tested by Johnston in a survey carried out in Beijing using the traditional 
method of BAS, Beijing Area Study, to ensure random sampling as well as survey questions 
designed to get at nationalist sentiment.184 Likewise, this was survey was conducted multiple 
times starting from 1998, 2000, and 2007 and compared with census data in China to verify 
variables, such as the education level of participants in the survey.185 The key takeaway from 
this Johnston’s work, in this case, is to show that the recent trend of Chinese policies towards 
minorities is likely not fueled by a nationalist sentiment in China growing out of control. 
What this implies is that Chinese national identity is impacted more from elite views of 
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Chinese national identity as opposed to rising nationalist sentiments of the Chinese 
population or elite. 
 
Uighur response to policies in post-Deng China 
China has been seen to have rewritten the history books of the Uighurs promoting the 
idea of Zhonghuaminzu, which subsumes the identity of minorities in China into a Han 
narrative. 186 There have been increased efforts on China’s part to subsume the culture and 
erode ethnic identities in China deemed undesirable.187 The 2003 white paper, which is a 
Chinese policy, denied that Uighurs had a historical tie to the Xinjiang region.188 In 
contemporary terms China has had increased ties to foreign countries that are Muslim, such 
as Turkey, while also actively seeking to undermine the culture and language of Muslim 
groups in China.189 China has gone from policies supporting minority groups to policies 
designed to target them. There have been increasingly violent clashes between the Uighurs 
and Chinese authorities in the Xinjiang region since the 1990s.190 Chinese government 
workers have been prohibited from attending prayer services and practicing religion 
openly.191 China in contemporary terms has couched this conflict in terms of terrorism where 
Uighur actions are seen as acts of terror, often the response from the government being group 
executions or reeducation camps.192 China doesn’t see these actions as discrimination against 
Uighurs, but rather a strategy for integrating them into Chinese national identity.193  
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There is an issue of inequality in China today. The Gini coefficient in 2012 measures 
inequality ranging from 0-1 with zero being complete equality and 1 complete inequality. In 
China, the Gini coefficient has risen from .38 in 1988 to .47 in 2012.194 Most of this is 
commonly attributed in the Western media to ethnic differences.195 However, much of the 
inequality in China stems from the Han being primarily in urban areas as compared to other 
ethnic groups.196 Likewise, Uighur high school and college attendance rates are comparable 
to Han in Western China suggesting that the issue is geographic as opposed to bias and 
discrimination.197  
In 2007 a Chinese raid on a training camp in Xinjiang resulted in the death of 18 
suspected terrorists and one policeman.198 This also resulted in the capture of 17 more 
Uighurs suspected of terrorist activities199 This event was used a launching off point for 
increased repressive policies in the Xinjiang region due to the perceived connection of 
Uighurs to international terror groups. Davis ties these more recent trends of China to the rise 
of the PRC in China and in repressive policies put into place in the mid-1990s.200 Davis 
analyzes how states protections for minorities were extensive on paper, but actual 
policy/practice has shifted towards repression since the 1990s.201  China held large scale 
military exercises in the Xinjiang region explicitly to flex its military muscle and to reiterate 
the narrative of China’s liberation of the region.202 This continues into the early 2000s with 
Hu Jintao placing a larger emphasis on the economic development of the Xinjiang region in 
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order to promote peace with minority groups. By the mid-2000s however, this narrative of 
economic reform lost traction among the Chinese elite and instead becomes increasingly 
focused on the need to go on the offensive to combat the three evils of “separatism”, 
“extremism”, and “terrorism”.203 Zhang Xiuming, deputy secretary of the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, who is also Han, is quoted 
during this time as saying “We need to take the Initiative and go on the offensive, crack 
down on gangs as soon as they surface and strike the first blow.”204 What this suggests is that 
when China perceives its identity being threatened by foreign influences it reacts violently to 
it. The PRC places a large emphasis upon assimilation policies to maintain the territorial 
integrity of the country. In effect, the PRC perceives repression as key to resolving the 
problem of resistance to assimilation.  
The suspicion of the three evils, terrorism, extremism, and separatism isn’t new in 
China. There have been violent protests to China’s rule in the Xinjiang region starting from 
the beginning of the PRC’s control of the region in 1949 and escalating in intensity in the 
1990s. China has denounced the rise of extremism in this region and has engaged in 
increasingly extreme measures to stop it. However, this hasn’t been entirely effective as 
violent resistance to Chinese rule of Xinjiang is becoming more cohesive due to repression in 
Xinjiang. Likewise, the increased NGO presence in Xinjiang threatens the Chinese narrative 
of events in the region. Uighurs have been reaching out more NGOs and to the United 
Nations to highlight Chinese abuses of human rights. 
Uighurs have responded to repressive policies in China by increasing the number of 
terrorist attacks in Xinjiang. The July 2009 terror attacks in Xinjiang resulted in 200 dead and 
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1700 injured. China viewed this attack as a result of the growth of separatist tendencies in 
Xinjiang and due to the fact minorities were not adopting a Chinese “national” identity. 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) found that China’s Strike Hard Campaign against Violent 
Terrorism started in 2016 and has been used to effectively arrest Uighurs who have a 
disparaging view of China. This has also led to the creation of political reeducation camps in 
Xinjiang explicitly for the purpose of helping foster a Chinese national identity in line with 
the elite in the PRC.205 China characterizes these camps as a vocational education and 
employment training centers for criminals involved in minor offenses. These facilities are 
designed to encourage Chinese national identity through forced activities such as singing the 
praises the CCP, learning Mandarin, and what the Human Rights Watch has referred to as 
political indoctrination meetings.206 
China has also banned naming babies certain names associated with Uighur 
backgrounds in 2017.207 This was done under the idea that the names could promote religious 
fervor.208 This is also after some officials in Xinjiang were reprimanded for not daring to 
smoke in front of religious buildings as this didn’t express the correct political stance China 
wishes to convey.209 What these types of policies suggest is that China is codifying its 
conception of national identity in increasingly stringent terms to combat a threat to national 
unity. China also in the same year banned abnormal beards or veils in public places and 
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imposed various punishments for refusing to watch state TV or radio programs.210 These 
policies in the Xinjiang region are all an effort to entrench an “official” version of Chinese 
national identity in the Xinjiang region. This suggests that China has become increasingly 
rigid in both affirming a singular “national” and in the employment of coercive policies and 
actions towards “dissidents.” 
The Uighur resistance to policies in Xinjiang has increased drastically as Chinese policies 
have become more repressive.211 While this has gained some international attention, very 
little is being done to correct the human rights abuses in the Xinjiang region.212 Likewise, 
China’s promises to remove reeducation centers and reeducation through labor programs 
have not been upheld.213 Uighurs are still faced with highly repressive policies despite Xi’s 
promise to “put power in a cage,” meaning that China will be beholden unto the rule of 
law.214 This has led to the rise of extremism in Xinjiang as it becomes increasingly apparent 
that China is willing to abridge the human rights of Uighurs. 
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 Chinese national identity has gone through three major periods since 1949. These 
were the the socialist period (1945-1975), the post socialist period (1975-2010), and China 
post-Deng (2010-2019). This allows for an analysis of Chinese national identity and the 
continuities and discontinuities towards Uighurs in the Xinjiang region. This has several 
implications for the importance of Chinese national identity for policies to minorities overall. 
Mao’s constant revolution narrative, in addition to Mao’s later persecution of 
minority groups, had ramifications for Chinese state policy towards Uighurs. Mao brought 
about major reforms in China regarding property rights and the construction of autonomous 
regions. These autonomous regions reflected the Chinese Constitutions requirements to 
preserve the unity of minorities. Likewise, the Uighurs received protections regarding 
language and even received several protections regarding control of the Xinjiang regions 
government and security forces. Chinese national identity was reflected in the policies 
towards Uighurs during this time. However, as this narrative subsumed the history of 
Uighurs under the Han, there was violent resistance to China’s control of the region. The 
protections and rights given helped offset this violence, instead leading to a scholarly dispute 
between Hans and Uighurs regarding Xinjiang’s history.  
Deng’s emphasis on pragmatism and development allowed for a period of minority 
rights to flourish in China. Lessened control of the CCP and more encouragement for all the 
people of China to contribute, regardless of if they were a foreigner or a minority, helped 
alter Chinese policy towards the Uighurs in Xinjiang. However, many of these rights were 
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not reflected in the realities in Xinjiang. This is due to the massive influx of Han into the 
Xinjiang region and the developmental programs tendency to promote a pro-China narrative. 
The Xinjiang Class provides a good example of this failure. While it provided easier access 
to higher education, it didn’t live up to its promises regarding treatment of Uighurs as equals. 
This increased Han presence in Xinjiang increased the level of violence in the region. The 
Uighurs response to this reflected the perceived unfairness of the situation as rights were 
expressed for them in the Chinese constitution but were not upheld in practice.  
Xi’s revolution in China bringing about a new era of Chinese leadership on the global 
stage and the need for more control in Asia has in turn increased repressive policies towards 
minorities. The process of China reforming and opening themselves up to trade is being 
replaced in China with policies to set themselves up as a leader in the international system.215 
Reeducation and the establishment of Chinese national identity as a way of proposing 
counter values to the world stage is increasingly important to China’s efforts to set 
themselves up as a global leader. Chinese national identity, as expressed in document NO. 7. 
highlighted how protections for minorities were secondary to a pro Chinese narrative. 
Policies put into China during this time reflected Chinese national identity. This document 
expressed the explicit fear of rising terrorism in Xinjiang and the fear they would use 
connections outside of China to further their aims. The Uighur response to increased 
repression has been in line with this fear. The incidence of terrorism in Xinjiang has 
increased as well as increased international attention to the Xinjiang region regarding human 
rights. Likewise, the increased militancy of the Islamic movements globally has empowered 
Uighurs to resist Chinese rule.  
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Considering these three periods overall suggests that Chinese national identity in each 
period builds from the previous period. A factor that demonstrates this clearly is that there is 
a certain level of blending between each period; policies regarding minorities didn’t suddenly 
change but instead shifted over time as each period went on. In addition, the shifts in the 
Chinese Constitution and white papers in China were not complete departures from the prior 
Constitutions in China. However, subtle changes in these documents opened new ways in 
which Uighurs were understood. Mao’s utopian rhetoric highlighted the importance of 
diversity inside of a unitary state. National identity in Xinjiang conflicted with Uighurs along 
this narrative of a unitary state of China having a right to rule Xinjiang. Deng’s pragmatism 
caused unequal development to occur in China, which advantaged the Han over the Uighurs. 
Likewise, the emphasis on pragmatism over ideology meant that the Xinjiang region adopted 
policies that may have ostensibly lauded equality but in practice advantaged a pro-China 
message over Uighur rights. Furthermore, the violence in a post-Deng era removed most of 
the pretense of equality rights for Uighurs and doubled down on repressive policies towards 
Uighurs. This may or may not result in the assimilation of Uighurs, but what is known is that 
it currently has resulted in the increased resistance of Uighurs to Chinese rule. 
Chinese policies toward Uighurs in Xinjiang reflect elite viewpoints in each period.  
However, the period towards the end of the socialist period and throughout post socialist 
period suggests that Chinese national identity wasn’t upheld for the case of the Uighurs. 
What this could suggest was the increased flexibility during the changes implemented by 
Deng left Chinese national identity more in flux then the socialist or post-Deng period. China 
post-Deng has seen a reemergence of a coherent narrative regarding Chinese national 
identity. Chinese national identity and repressive policies towards Uighurs are in alignment. 
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It is possible that this is a particularity brought about by the implementation of Capitalist 
practices in China. However, more study would be necessary to demonstrate this fact. What 
this case study does demonstrate is that Chinese national identity changed several times since 
1949. These changes were widely reflected in the case of the Uighurs suggesting the 
importance of Chinese national identity in china’s control of the Xinjiang region. 
Furthermore, it demonstrates that there was the least amount of violence in the Xinjiang 
region when the Uighurs were treated with autonomy. The development of the Xinjiang 
region has offset the peace in the region and unified the Uighurs against a common enemy. 
China’s elites have seemingly brought about a self-fulfilling prophecy as resistance to 
Chinese rule intensified when faced with increased repressive policies. China has engaged in 
a policy of cooption and cooperation with minority groups in each period to further the 
conception of Chinese national identity. The Uighur populations in Xinjiang have been 
somewhat dispersed but their resistance to China has increased drastically since 1949. 
Implications of Chinese national identity on legitimacy   
One of the major points made by Lum is that there could be a legitimacy crisis 
looming in China threatening to radically change the Chinese political landscape.216 The case 
of Xinjiang and the policies advanced therein suggests that China is actively taking steps to 
ensure its population maintains a state defined Chinese national identity in line with the CCP 
policy. Kingdon’s work on policy in the United States suggests that should something have a 
large policy legacy then it is much harder to alter or ignore the policy. In the case of China, 
policies designed to maintain Chinese national identity have a long legacy that makes it very 
difficult to dismantle. China has drastically increased its oversight of social management 
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programs in China which are involved with local elections and imposed an increased security 
presence in locations such as Tibet or Xinjiang.217 
 The socialist period of Chinese rule used Mao as a beacon of legitimacy of CCP rule. 
The cult of personality that formed around Mao allowed for the CCP to mobilize large 
portions of population towards policy aims. The post socialist period of Chinese identity 
attempts to balance tradition and modernity. China actively looked outside of itself to 
introduce better governance in China. This was done in almost purely pragmatic terms by 
Deng who had experienced the persecution of both Western sources and from Chinese 
officials. Deng was faced with a Western world deep in the cold war and heavily biased 
against non-Western lines of thinking. This was a time period where the shape of your head 
or the color of skin was a sign of your intelligence. Vukovich highlighted how this was only 
prominent in Western epistemology and that China developed its own understanding of 
ethnicity separate from a Western model. Post-Deng China has faced increased scrutiny from 
international sources, such as NGOs or other states, as it has attempted to increase its global 
standing. This is reflected in China’s bold policy goals such as the New Belt New Road 
Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank. 
Conceptual gaps in understanding Chinese national identity 
There could be an issue in how Chinese national identity is understood because of a 
Western bias. Pan Zhongyi’s work in 2012 highlights how China interprets concepts is 
different than the European Union.218 A conceptual gap is defined as the distance between 
how two individuals understand, define, and interpret a concept.219 The reason for this gap is 
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that China has a different culture and understanding than the EU and this has impacted how 
policy has been put into effect. Debrah Stone highlights this in her work Policy Paradox in 
1997. Stone highlights how concepts such as freedom, equality, and power can have different 
meanings depending on how you understand the concept. For example, equality can be 
drastically different if your focus is on equality of outcome as opposed to equality of 
opportunity. Seeking a solution to a problem can vary drastically depending on what 
someone values and how they measure success. What Stone’s work demonstrates most of all 
is that politics cannot be removed from analytical approaches. China values human rights but 
sees stability as the key for achieving lasting human rights in China.220 The importance of 
sovereignty to China to maintain human rights is contrasted with Europe’s view that 
sovereignty is secondary to ensuring abuses don’t occur.221 What this demonstrates is that 
Europe and China both place a large emphasis on history, culture and socioeconomic 
development but that these things being different in cultural contexts can lead to a gap 
between how each country understands the paths to achieve their goals.222 It is important to 
be mindful of the conceptual gap between the West and the East in that it can lead to 
different understandings and the development of competing epistemologies. Putting one 
above the other as the better way of doing something could prove to be tone deaf in dealing 
with another country on an equal footing. What this means is that this project’s 
understanding of Chinese national identity could be biased towards a Western lens. 
Concluding Remarks 
Looking into each period of Chinese identity helps demonstrate the tension between 
Uighurs and Chinese national identity in the Xinjiang region. This tension is framed by the 
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changes in Chinese national identity. Assimilation has always been the goal in the Xinjiang 
region but how China related this to the Uighurs changed over time. The socialist period in 
China highlights the importance of creating harmony between different viewpoints and the 
exploration of what China could be, focused on embracing different identities in China. Deng 
furthered this aim and embraced elements of liberal economic theory. The need to ensure 
party supremacy incited violence in the Xinjiang region. China’s response to this was to 
enforce assimilation policies in the region. Post-Deng China becomes increasingly globalized 
as the threat of Uighurs gathering support from the Islamic world and the rise of terrorism 
increased China’s need to establish legitimacy in the Xinjiang region. Forced assimilation via 
mass reeducation is the result of China’s efforts to establish Chinese national identity in 
Xinjiang; it hasn’t yet proven to be effective at preventing violence and could in fact unify 
Uighurs against China. 
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